Today I will offer a progress report on the Federal Open Market Committee"s (FOMC) efforts to restore price stability to the U.S. economy for the benefit of the American people. The report must begin by acknowledging the reality that inflation remains far too high. My colleagues and I are acutely aware that high inflation is imposing significant hardship, straining budgets and shrinking what paychecks will buy. This is especially painful for those least able to meet the higher costs of essentials like food, housing, and transportation. Price stability is the responsibility of the Federal Reserve and serves as the bedrock of our economy. Without price stability, the economy does not work for anyone. In particular, without price stability, we will not achieve a sustained period of strong labor market conditions that benefit all.

今天我想向諸位提供一份FOMC恢復美國經濟價格穩(wěn)定的進展報告，恢復價格穩(wěn)定旨在造福美國人民。報告必須先承認通脹率仍然過高的現實。我和我的同事切身地意識到了高通脹正在造成重大的困難，使預算緊張而薪水的購買力也變得吃緊。對于那些最無力支付食品、住房和交通等必需品成本的人來說，通脹尤其痛苦。保持價格穩(wěn)定是美聯儲的責任，也是我們經濟的基石。沒有價格穩(wěn)定，經濟對任何人都無濟于事。需要強調的是，沒有價格穩(wěn)定，我們就無法實現惠及所有人的可持續(xù)的強勁勞動力市場狀況。

We currently estimate that 12-month personal consumption expenditures (PCE) inflation through October ran at 6.0 percent (figure 1).1 While October inflation data received so far showed a welcome surprise to the downside, these are a single month"s data, which followed upside surprises over the previous two months. As figure 1 makes clear, down months in the data have often been followed by renewed increases. It will take substantially more evidence to give comfort that inflation is actually declining. By any standard, inflation remains much too high.

【資料圖】

根據我們目前的估計，截至今年10月的12個月個人消費支出（PCE）通脹率為6%（圖1）。雖然迄今為止收到的10月份通脹數據顯示出令人欣喜的下行意外，但這只是單月的數據，而此前我們才經歷了兩個月的通脹上行意外。正如圖1所表明的，數據下降的當月往往緊隨其后的是通脹的再度回升。我們需要更多的證據才能讓我們確信通脹率確實在下降。從任何標準來看，通脹率仍然太高。

For purposes of this discussion, I will focus my comments on core PCE inflation, which omits the food and energy inflation components, which have been lower recently but are quite volatile. Our inflation goal is for total inflation, of course, as food and energy prices matter a great deal for household budgets. But core inflation often gives a more accurate indicator of where overall inflation is headed. Twelve-month core PCE inflation stands at 5.0 percent in our October estimate, approximately where it stood last December when policy tightening was in its early stages. Over 2022, core inflation rose a few tenths above 5 percent and fell a few tenths below, but it mainly moved sideways. So when will inflation come down?

在今天的討論中，我將重點評論核心PCE通脹，即剔除了食品和能源的通脹，這兩大部類最近走低但波動很大。當然，我們的通脹目標是總體通脹，因為食品和能源價格對家庭的預算有很大的影響。但是，核心通脹率往往能提供一個更準確的指明整體通脹走向的指標。在我們10月份的估計中，12個月的核心PCE通脹率為5%，大約是去年12月政策緊縮的早期階段的水平。今年全年，核心通脹率在5%上下波動呈橫向走勢。那么問題來了，通脹率何時會回落？

I could answer this question by pointing to the inflation forecasts of private-sector forecasters or of FOMC participants, which broadly show a significant decline over the next year. But forecasts have been predicting just such a decline for more than a year, while inflation has moved stubbornly sideways. The truth is that the path ahead for inflation remains highly uncertain. For now, let"s put aside the forecasts and look instead to the macroeconomic conditions we think we need to see to bring inflation down to 2 percent over time.

我們可以通過私人部門預測者或FOMC參與者的通脹預測來回答這個問題，預測廣泛地指向了明年 （通脹）可能大幅下降。但是，一年多來，預測者一直在預測通脹會下降，而通脹卻頑固地橫向移動。事實是，通貨膨脹的未來路徑仍然非常不確定?，F在，讓我們拋開預測，審視我們認為需要看到的宏觀經濟條件，以便在一段時間內將通脹率降至2%。

For starters, we need to raise interest rates to a level that is sufficiently restrictive to return inflation to 2 percent. There is considerable uncertainty about what rate will be sufficient, although there is no doubt that we have made substantial progress, raising our target range for the federal funds rate by 3.75 percentage points since March. As our last postmeeting statement indicates, we anticipate that ongoing increases will be appropriate. It seems to me likely that the ultimate level of rates will need to be somewhat higher than thought at the time of the September meeting and Summary of Economic Projections. I will return to policy at the end of my comments, but for now, I will simply say that we have more ground to cover.

首先，我們需要將利率提高到一個有足夠限制性的水平，使通脹恢復到2%。至于什么水平的利率才是足夠限制性的則有很大的不確定性，盡管毫無疑問，我們已經取得了實質性的進展，自3月份以來，我們將聯邦基金利率的目標區(qū)間范圍提高了3.75%。正如聯儲上次的會后聲明所指出的，我們預計持續(xù)提高利率將是適當的。在我看來，終端利率很可能需要比9月會議和經濟預測摘要時的數字更高一些。我將在評論的最后回到政策問題上，但現在我只想說，我們還有更多的工作要做。

We are tightening the stance of policy in order to slow growth in aggregate demand. Slowing demand growth should allow supply to catch up with demand and restore the balance that will yield stable prices over time. Restoring that balance is likely to require a sustained period of below-trend growth.

我們正在收緊政策的立場，以遏制總需求的增長。需求增長放緩應當會使得供應趕上需求，恢復供需平衡，從而在一段時間內帶來穩(wěn)定的價格。恢復這種平衡可能需要一段持續(xù)的低于趨勢水平的經濟增長期。

Last year, the ongoing reopening of the economy boosted real gross domestic product (GDP) growth to a very strong 5.7 percent. This year, GDP was roughly flat through the first three quarters, and indicators point to modest growth this quarter, which seems likely to bring the year in with very modest growth overall. Several factors contributed to this slowing growth, including the waning effects of reopening and of pandemic fiscal support, the global implications of Russia"s war against Ukraine, and our policy actions, which tightened financial conditions and are affecting economic activity, particularly in interest-sensitive sectors such as housing. We can say that demand growth has slowed, and we expect that this growth will need to remain at a slower pace for a sustained period.

去年，經濟重啟推升了美國的實際GDP增長，增速達到非常強勁的5.7%。今年，實際GDP在前三個季度基本持平，而各項指標顯示本季度增長溫和，這似乎可能使今年的總體經濟增長非常溫和。有幾個因素致使增長放緩，包括重啟和疫情期財政支持的消褪，俄烏沖突的全球影響，以及我們的貨幣政策行動，政策收緊了金融條件，正對經濟活動構成影響，尤其是在房地產等對利率敏感的部門。經濟需求的增長已經放緩，我們預計增長需要在一段持續(xù)期內保持較慢的速度。

Despite the tighter policy and slower growth over the past year, we have not seen clear progress on slowing inflation. To assess what it will take to get inflation down, it is useful to break core inflation into three component categories: core goods inflation, housing services inflation, and inflation in core services other than housing (figure 2).

盡管過去一年政策收緊且增長放緩，但我們仍未看到通脹放緩的明顯進展。為了評估要怎樣才能使通脹下降，需要將核心通脹率切分為三個組成部分進行分析：核心商品通脹率、住房服務通脹率和住房以外的核心服務通脹率（圖2）。

Core goods inflation has moved down from very high levels over the course of 2022, while housing services inflation has risen rapidly. Inflation in core services ex housing has fluctuated but shown no clear trend. I will discuss each of these items in turn.

今年，核心商品通脹率已經從非常高的水平下降，而住房服務通脹率則迅速上升。除住房外的核心服務通脹率有所波動，但沒有顯露出明顯的趨勢。我將逐一探討各個分項。

Early in the pandemic, goods prices began rising rapidly, as abnormally strong demand was met by pandemic-hampered supply. Reports from businesses and many indicators suggest that supply chain issues are now easing. Both fuel and nonfuel import prices have fallen in recent months, and indicators of prices paid by manufacturers have moved down. While 12-month core goods inflation remains elevated at 4.6 percent, it has fallen nearly 3 percentage points from earlier in the year. It is far too early to declare goods inflation vanquished, but if current trends continue, goods prices should begin to exert downward pressure on overall inflation in coming months.

在疫情的早期，商品價格開始迅速上漲，異常強勁的需求碰上了疫情導致的供應破壞。來自企業(yè)的報告和許多指標表明，供應鏈問題現在正在緩和。近幾個月來，燃料和非燃料進口價格都有所下降，制造商支付的價格也有所下降。雖然12個月的核心商品通脹率仍然高達4.6%，但與今年年初相比已經下降了近3%?，F在就宣稱制服了商品通脹還為時尚早，但如果目前的趨勢延續(xù)下去，商品價格應該在未來幾個月開始對整體通脹產生下行壓力。

Housing services inflation measures the rise in the price of all rents and the rise in the rental-equivalent cost of owner-occupied housing. Unlike goods inflation, housing services inflation has continued to rise and now stands at 7.1 percent over the past 12 months. Housing inflation tends to lag other prices around inflation turning points, however, because of the slow rate at which the stock of rental leases turns over.2 The market rate on new leases is a timelier indicator of where overall housing inflation will go over the next year or so. Measures of 12-month inflation in new leases rose to nearly 20 percent during the pandemic but have been falling sharply since about midyear (figure 3).

住房服務通脹衡量的是所有租金價格的上漲和業(yè)主自住房的租金等值成本的上漲。與商品通脹不同，住房服務通脹持續(xù)上升，在過去12個月中為7.1%。然而，在通脹的轉折點，住房通脹往往會滯后于其他價格，因為租約重置的速度較慢。在疫情期間，新租約的12個月通脹率上升到近20%，但自年中以來一直在急劇下降（圖3）。

As figure 3 shows, however, overall housing services inflation has continued to rise as existing leases turn over and jump in price to catch up with the higher level of rents for new leases. This is likely to continue well into next year. But as long as new lease inflation keeps falling, we would expect housing services inflation to begin falling sometime next year. Indeed, a decline in this inflation underlies most forecasts of declining inflation.

如圖3所示，隨著現有租約的重置和價格跳升，以趕上新租約的更高租金水平，整體住房服務通脹持續(xù)上升。這種情況可能會持續(xù)到明年。但是，只要新租約的通貨膨脹率持續(xù)下降，我們預計住房服務通貨膨脹率將在明年某個時點開始下降。事實上，這部分通脹的下降是大多數通脹下降預測的基礎。

Finally, we come to core services other than housing. This spending category covers a wide range of services from health care and education to haircuts and hospitality. This is the largest of our three categories, constituting more than half of the core PCE index. Thus, this may be the most important category for understanding the future evolution of core inflation. Because wages make up the largest cost in delivering these services, the labor market holds the key to understanding inflation in this category.

最后，我們來看看住房以外的核心服務。這一支出類別涵蓋了從醫(yī)療保健和教育到理發(fā)和招待的廣泛服務。這是我們三個類別中最大的一個分項，占核心PCE的一半以上。因此，這可能是理解核心通脹未來演變的最重要分項。由于工資構成了提供這些服務的最大成本，勞動力市場是理解這一類別通脹的關鍵。

In the labor market, demand for workers far exceeds the supply of available workers, and nominal wages have been growing at a pace well above what would be consistent with 2 percent inflation over time.3 Thus, another condition we are looking for is the restoration of balance between supply and demand in the labor market.

在勞動力市場上，對工人的需求遠遠超過了現有工人的供應，名義工資的增長速度遠遠超過了與2%的通脹率相一致的水平。因此，我們要尋找的另一個壓低通脹的條件是恢復勞動力市場的供需平衡。

Signs of elevated labor market tightness emerged suddenly in mid-2021. The unemployment rate at the time was much higher than the 3.5 percent that had prevailed without major signs of tightness before the pandemic. Employment was still millions below its level on the eve of the pandemic. Looking back, we can see that a significant and persistent labor supply shortfall opened up during the pandemic—a shortfall that appears unlikely to fully close anytime soon.

勞動力市場緊湊的跡象在2021年中期突然浮現。當時的失業(yè)率遠遠高于疫情之前未有緊湊跡象的3.5%的水平。就業(yè)水平仍然比疫情前的水平低了數百萬?；仡欉^去，我們可以看到，疫情期出現了重大且持續(xù)的勞動力供應短缺——而這種短缺似乎不太可能被很快解決。

Comparing the current labor force with the Congressional Budget Office"s pre-pandemic forecast of labor force growth reveals a current labor force shortfall of roughly 3-1/2 million people (figure 4, left panel).4 This shortfall reflects both lower-than-expected population growth and a lower labor force participation rate (figure 4, right panel). Participation dropped sharply at the onset of the pandemic because of many factors, including sickness, caregiving, and fear of infection. Many forecasters expected that participation would move back up fairly quickly as the pandemic faded. And for workers in their prime working years, it mostly has. Overall participation, however, remains well below pre-pandemic trends.

將目前的勞動力水平與國會預算辦公室對勞動力增長的預測相比較，我們可以看到目前的勞動力缺口大約為350萬（圖4，左圖）。這一缺口既反映了人口增長低于預期，也反映了勞動參與率的下降（圖4，右圖）。由于許多因素，包括疾病、護理和對感染的恐懼，參與率在疫情開始時急劇下降。許多預測者預計，隨著疫情的消退，參與率將迅速回升。對于正值黃金工作年齡段的工人來說，參與率確實回升了。然而，總體參與率仍然遠遠低于疫情前的趨勢。

Some of the participation gap reflects workers who are still out of the labor force because they are sick with COVID-19 or continue to suffer lingering symptoms from previous COVID infections ("long COVID").5 But recent research by Fed economists finds that the participation gap is now mostly due to excess retirements—that is, retirements in excess of what would have been expected from population aging alone.6 These excess retirements might now account for more than 2 million of the 3?1/2 million shortfall in the labor force.7

一部分的參與率缺口反映了那些因為患有新冠肺炎或遭受“長新冠”困擾而仍未加入勞動力大軍的工人。但美聯儲經濟學家最近的研究發(fā)現，參與率的缺口現在主要是由于超額退休——即退休人數超出了由人口老齡化所推算的水平。這部分超額退休人員現在可能占到勞動力320萬缺口中的200萬以上。

What explains these excess retirements? Health issues have surely played a role, as COVID has posed a particularly large threat to the lives and health of the elderly.8 In addition, many older workers lost their jobs in the early stages of the pandemic, when layoffs were historically high. The cost of finding new employment may have appeared particularly large for these workers, given pandemic-related disruptions to the work environment and health concerns.9 Also, gains in the stock market and rising house prices in the first two years of the pandemic contributed to an increase in wealth that likely facilitated early retirement for some people.

是什么原因導致了超額退休？健康問題肯定發(fā)揮了作用，因為新冠肺炎對老年人的生活和健康構成了極大的威脅。此外，許多老年工人在疫情的早期階段失去了工作，當時的裁員率是歷史上最高的。考慮到與疫情有關的工作環(huán)境的破壞和健康問題，對這些老年工人而言，尋找新工作的成本可能特別大。此外，在疫情的頭兩年，股票市場的收益和房價的上漲促進了財富的增加，可能有助于一些人提前退休。

The data so far do not suggest that excess retirements are likely to unwind because of retirees returning to the labor force. Older workers are still retiring at higher rates, and retirees do not appear to be returning to the labor force in sufficient numbers to meaningfully reduce the total number of excess retirees.10

迄今為止的數據并不能保證超額退休人員有可能因為退休人員重返勞動力市場而得到緩解。老年工人的退休率仍然較高，而退休人員返回勞動力的數量似乎不足以有意義地減少超額退休人員的總數。

The second factor contributing to the labor supply shortfall is slower growth in the working-age population. The combination of a plunge in net immigration and a surge in deaths during the pandemic probably accounts for about 1-1/2 million missing workers.11

導致勞動力供應短缺的第二個因素是工作年齡人口的增長放緩。凈移民人數的驟減和疫情期間死亡人數的激增可能是造成約150萬工人“消失”的原因。

Policies to support labor supply are not the domain of the Fed: Our tools work principally on demand. Without advocating any particular policy, however, I will say that policies to support labor force participation could, over time, bring benefits to the workers who join the labor force and support overall economic growth. Such policies would take time to implement and have their effects, however. For the near term, a moderation of labor demand growth will be required to restore balance to the labor market.

支持勞動力供應的政策不在美聯儲的管轄范圍內。我們的工具主要是在需求方面發(fā)揮作用。然而，在不提倡任何特定政策的情況下，我要說的是，隨著時間的推移，支持勞動參與率的政策可以為加入勞動力的工人帶來好處，并支持整體經濟增長?？蛇@種政策需要時間來實施并產生效果。就短期來說，我們亟需緩和勞動力需求的增長來恢復勞動力市場的平衡。

Currently, the unemployment rate is at 3.7 percent, near 50-year lows, and job openings exceed available workers by about 4 million—that is about 1.7 job openings for every person looking for work (figure 5). So far, we have seen only tentative signs of moderation of labor demand. With slower GDP growth this year, job gains have stepped down from more than 450,000 per month over the first seven months of the year to about 290,000 per month over the past three months. But this job growth remains far in excess of the pace needed to accommodate population growth over time—about 100,000 per month by many estimates. Job openings have fallen by about 1.5 million this year but remain higher than at any time before the pandemic.

目前的失業(yè)率為3.7%，接近50年來的最低點，職位空缺則超過現有工人約400萬，即每一個找工作的人對應大約1.7個職位空缺（圖5）。迄今為止，我們只看到勞動力需求緩和的初步跡象。隨著今年GDP增長的放緩，就業(yè)崗位的增加已經從今年前七個月的每月45萬個以上降至過去三個月的每月29萬個左右。但這一就業(yè)增長仍然遠遠超過了適應人口增長所需的速度，即許多人所估算的每月約10萬個。今年職位空缺已經減少了約150萬個，但仍然高于疫情前的任何時候。

Wage growth, too, shows only tentative signs of returning to balance. Some measures of wage growth have ticked down recently (figure 6). But the declines are very modest so far relative to earlier increases and still leave wage growth well above levels consistent with 2 percent inflation over time. To be clear, strong wage growth is a good thing. But for wage growth to be sustainable, it needs to be consistent with 2 percent inflation.

工資增長也僅僅顯示出重歸平衡的初步跡象。一些衡量工資增長的指標最近有所下降（圖6）。但是，相對于早先的工資增長，迄今為止的下降是非常溫和的，并且仍然使工資增長遠遠高于與2%的通脹率相一致的水平。明確地說，強勁的工資增長是一件好事。但是，為了使工資增長能夠持續(xù)，它需要與2%的通脹率相一致。

Let"s sum up this review of economic conditions that we think we need to see to bring inflation down to 2 percent. Growth in economic activity has slowed to well below its longer-run trend, and this needs to be sustained. Bottlenecks in goods production are easing and goods price inflation appears to be easing as well, and this, too, must continue. Housing services inflation will probably keep rising well into next year, but if inflation on new leases continues to fall, we will likely see housing services inflation begin to fall later next year. Finally, the labor market, which is especially important for inflation in core services ex housing, shows only tentative signs of rebalancing, and wage growth remains well above levels that would be consistent with 2 percent inflation over time. Despite some promising developments, we have a long way to go in restoring price stability.

讓我們來總結一下今天我對經濟狀況的回顧——即我們認為要將通脹率降至2%所需要看到的經濟狀況。經濟活動的增長已經放緩，遠遠低于其長期趨勢，這需要保持。商品生產的瓶頸正在緩解，商品價格通脹似乎也在緩解，這也必須維持下去。住房服務通脹可能會一直上升到明年，但如果新租約的通脹繼續(xù)下降，我們將可能看到住房服務通脹在明年晚些時候開始下降。最后，對于除住房外的核心服務通脹尤為重要的勞動力市場，只顯示出再平衡的初步跡象，工資增長仍然遠遠高于與2%的通脹率長期保持一致的水平。盡管有一些好轉的跡象，可我們在恢復價格穩(wěn)定方面還有很長的路要走。

Returning to monetary policy, my FOMC colleagues and I are strongly committed to restoring price stability. After our November meeting, we noted that we anticipated that ongoing rate increases will be appropriate in order to attain a policy stance that is sufficiently restrictive to move inflation down to 2 percent over time.

回到貨幣政策，我和FOMC的同事們堅定地致力于恢復價格穩(wěn)定。在我們11月的會議后，我們指出，我們預計持續(xù)的加息將是適當的，以達到一個足以限制通脹率在一段時間內下降到2%的政策姿態(tài)。

Monetary policy affects the economy and inflation with uncertain lags, and the full effects of our rapid tightening so far are yet to be felt. Thus, it makes sense to moderate the pace of our rate increases as we approach the level of restraint that will be sufficient to bring inflation down. The time for moderating the pace of rate increases may come as soon as the December meeting. Given our progress in tightening policy, the timing of that moderation is far less significant than the questions of how much further we will need to raise rates to control inflation, and the length of time it will be necessary to hold policy at a restrictive level. It is likely that restoring price stability will require holding policy at a restrictive level for some time. History cautions strongly against prematurely loosening policy. We will stay the course until the job is done.

貨幣政策對經濟和通貨膨脹的影響具有不確定的滯后性，而且我們迄今為止的快速緊縮政策的全部效果還沒有顯現出來。因此，當我們接近足以使通貨膨脹率下降的約束水平時，放緩我們的加息步伐是說得通的。放緩加息步伐的時機可能最快在12月的議息會議上到來。考慮到我們在政策緊縮方面的進展，放緩的時間節(jié)點遠沒有我們需要進一步提高利率以控制通貨膨脹，且有必要將政策保持在限制性水平的持續(xù)期等問題重要?；謴蛢r格穩(wěn)定可能需要在一段時間內將政策保持在限制性水平。歷史警示我們不要過早地放松政策。我們將堅持到底，直到大功告成。

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關鍵詞： 價格穩(wěn)定 勞動力市場 迄今為止